Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe the year 2000; 1999 or 2000. I don't have the absolute date on that.

Thank you, Mr. Minister. Mr. Hawkins.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What year did this company come forward and stress they would not be able to make their payments or meet their guarantee over the long term? How was it acknowledged at the territorial government that this was the problem and what year was that?

Thank you, Mr. Hawkins. Mr. Minister.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The information provided now is June of 2000 the guarantee was put in place; that is the timeline for when the agreement was brought forward and Cabinet looked at the problems that were arising and came up with structuring this deal. The guarantee was called in July 2002.

Thank you, Mr. Minister. Mr. Hawkins.

Did the Minister say July 2002? I didn't hear him and I didn't have my earpiece.

That's correct. He said July 2002. Mr. Hawkins.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For the record, we will note that's approximately two years after the agreement was put into place and the wheels went forward when obviously there were troubles. At the time of the year 2000, is the Minister in a position to articulate what securities were put into place in order to guarantee?

Thank you, Mr. Hawkins. Mr. Minister.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The GNWT, when it enters into these types of arrangements where guarantees are required, would request a number of things and provide a number of provisions: most guarantees provide that working capital draws must be margined against inventory and accounts receivable; that the parent company and owners must cross-guarantee the GNWT; that regular reporting must occur; that the GNWT has the right of audit; and, that the GNWT retains the ability to approve any ownership changes or significant corporate restructuring; that loan guarantees are also secured by assignments of accounts receivable, assignments of inventory, fixed and floating debentures against all assets of the companies; and, where there is a parent corporation which is providing a cross-guarantee, similar security is provided by the parent company. Thank you.

Thank you for that detail, Mr. Minister. Mr. Hawkins.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Are those cross-guarantees still in place? Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Hawkins. Mr. Minister.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In this case, the guarantee was called, so the parent company became involved and that's who this agreement is signed with: the parent company. They are now paying the principal of $2.6 million. So the guarantee was called. We did, as a government, in the past, sign an agreement to establish this and the way it has been handled is noted here today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Minister. Mr. Hawkins.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am just trying to understand some of the discretion here on this particular case. I keep going back to the fact that this is $800,000. It could have done a lot of good to the territorial government. I can also take the perspective of the government and see that at least we are getting our

principal back. To that end, I will clearly say thank you. If we don't get something back, obviously we will all hurt. It's the assurity part over the long term and the fact that there are a few issues here.

If this is an industry that the bank is even afraid of backing, yet we have multi-international companies coming forward stepping into this industry without assistance, and I go back to the banks are uncomfortable, what public interest are we truly protecting? That creates some concern. This was clearly one of those instances where we are getting back our principal, which is great, but it shows some weakness in the system.

My biggest fear, as I leave this -- this will be my last comment -- is how does the government ensure that I get satisfaction from this because as we proceed forward, my community and my constituents have to know that our government is doing what we can. I see this as lost money that is owed to the Government of the Northwest Territories. The next time, how will all Regular Members hear about something like this, something that goes awry in the future -- be it whatever circumstance; if it's $5,000, maybe someone is being railroaded due to bad circumstances, bad credit, where we are allowing to let $800,000 -- how will we be assured that we will know this is going on long before the ink has dried? Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Hawkins. Mr. Minister.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I stated earlier, as a Minister of this government responsible for this area, as I become aware of situations in this whole area we've discussed for the last few hours, I will do my part to inform Members before the ink is dry on any deal. I also have informed Members that the Cabinet, the Members of the FMB that you have elected, would have to use due diligence to ensure that we are making the best decisions on behalf of residents of the NWT. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Minister. We've got Mr. Braden next.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, have some closing comments on this issue. We talked about how stringent the deals were and the guarantees were and research has turned up words exactly to this extent from Hansard of April 29, 1999, when then Finance Minister Dent assured Members that the terms of the loan guarantee agreement with the company negotiated at the time: "...are quite stringent. They far just short of acquiring a firstborn son, but they are extremely stringent in how they are set out to protect the interests of the government." Mr. Dent, I know, is an experienced Minister, a predecessor of yours, Mr. Roland. I quite seriously believe that we cut a good deal. However, it is in our implementation of the terms of that deal when it went wrong that is of such concern to us. I think that is amply evident.

Mr. Chairman, the Minister has done a very credible job in defending Cabinet's solidarity and decisions, even though he was not part of Cabinet that made this decision. On either this deal or others, whether they are financial or political, if they are not a good deal, I don't want to be saddled with it and I don't think this Assembly should be saddled with unpleasant or unpopular decisions made by previous governments that were just wrong.

One of the ones that come to mind most clearly for me is the North Slave Correctional Centre that is just about being completed out here at extraordinary cost overruns. If I knew at the beginning of the 14th term -- when the decisions started to come before us to approve this, approve this, approve this, and we kept on approving, approving and approving -- what I know now...The plan and deal were both made by the 13th Assembly. I have learned from that, Mr. Chairman. When I don't like a deal, although something is happening, I will not be tethered because it was a previous administration that made it. That is why I have been so adamant on this one.

Because we chose not to act to the fullest extent on behalf of the taxpayer, I have to continue to have a degree of cynicism, Mr. Chairman, about how even this Cabinet may conclude or may decide it has to deal with situations that come before it. I suppose it's one of the best arguments because of the inconsistency and the fact that decisions will be made behind Cabinet doors with little or no input from us or anyone else, is that this is still a possibility and a potential that maybe FMBS should get out of the business of loaning and guaranteeing projects at any risk. Isn't this why we already have at least two different lending arms already? If we can't assign terms, conditions and legislation solid enough for those people to make decisions on our behalf, then I really must continue to express a degree of cynicism about leaving these kinds of decisions at the political level behind closed doors.

Mr. Chairman, if this decision was before us now, there is no question that the answer would be no. We would direct the department to act for the fullest benefit of the taxpayer and cover our exposure on this.

I had prepared a motion, Mr. Chairman, to do the only thing that Committee of the Whole can do in the face of a budget and that is to delete this item. It would have caused the department then to seek the money internally. It would have not gotten new money to pay this. It would have perhaps, Mr. Chairman, only been punitive to the department to do that. The taxpayer would not benefit from any motion to delete or any further measure of censure. The decision has been made and we have to follow through with that. So I am not going to put forward this motion to delete. It's not going to do much good, but I would like to think, Mr. Chairman, after two hours of debate on this and Mr. Roland's repeated assurances that he is going to defend the taxpayer to the fullest extent possible, that I would like to recommend we close debate on this, page 2-51, and move on with the balance of this ministry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Braden. I think that will conclude comments on this. I don't see any more comments. We will move now to page 2-51. That's page 2-51, grants and contributions, total grants, $120,000.

Page 2-53, we are now on the Audit Bureau. Operations expense, total operations expense, $1.263 million. Ms. Lee.