Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, don’t feel that this bridge, never felt that this bridge was a benefit to anyone that I represent in this Legislative Assembly. However, from the very outset I initially believed that this government was in for the amount that was guaranteed to the Deh Cho Bridge Corporation in the concession agreement of something in the neighbourhood of $9 million to $10 million. I initially believed that. I didn’t know at the very beginning, in October 2007 when I was elected and there was discussion on the Deh Cho Bridge, that this government had guaranteed the loan of $165 million. That wasn’t made to clear, to me anyway. I don’t know how clear that was to anyone else in the House. However, to me, from

what I heard in the House, in exchanges I heard in the House, it was a $9.5 million loan guarantee was what this government was in for.

Now I find out that we’re actually in it for the full $165 million. I guess, you know, it should have been actually something that I could have figured out myself, actually, because the equity partner, the private partner didn’t have any equity. Therefore, how could a company without equity borrow $165 million to build a piece of infrastructure that really has a questionable return on investment? So questionable, in fact, the government would have to support the operations of the bridge by using all of the money that is now being spent on ferry operations and the operation and construction of the winter road that goes across the Mackenzie now at this point.

Now the bridge is at $181 million and on February 1st , I believe it was around February 1st , between

the 29th of January and February 1st , this

government returned to members in Priorities and Planning for a supplementary appropriation of $15 million. At that point my question was are we beyond the point of no return and should we stop the construction of the Deh Cho Bridge, pull the piers out or leave the piers in for maybe potential future construction; however, at that point, abandon the project. However, it appeared as though the costs at that time, which appeared to be fairly significant for getting nothing, were, I believe, well over $100 million already. So it seemed as though we were beyond the point of no return already in February when the last budget session started. We were advised that the project was now 50 percent complete at that time. The project now has four more piers, and we heard that it’s 50 percent complete now.

I’m not sure that the information that we went with on February 1st was exactly 100 percent accurate;

at least it wasn’t in my mind. I still, like my colleague Mr. Abernethy, feel that we have no options. I think our option to stop at this point would probably do further financial damage to the Government of the Northwest Territories than proceeding. However, I think it’s going to cost more than what is estimated at this point.

I’m no expert in bridge building, but I do see the trend going from what the initial cost was, I believe, in 2004, of about $52 million was the budget. It’s gone from that to a signing of $65 million to $165 million to $181 million. Now we’re finally out of the water and we are going to be essentially building the bridge over top of the piers at this point.

I said it before back on February 1st that I felt that

this bridge would cost a lot more than what is budgeted at this time. I still think it will. In the best-case scenario it doesn’t cost any more. However, we are taking on a major long-term debt. I do believe that the Government of the Northwest

Territories builds infrastructure, borrows the money to build infrastructure and then quickly, with surplus dollars in the immediate years preceding the completion of infrastructure, starts to pay it back so that at some point it is still potentially possible for the government to reduce its debt down to zero. It is still potentially possible. This makes it not possible unless we pay huge penalties. So we are kind of into this for a very long term.

I will question the government when I have an opportunity to. I am very interested in why the loan is structured the way the loan is structured. I am interested in why the government was not able to negotiate a term shorter than 35 years. I am not talking about the full amortization period here, Mr. Chairman, I am talking about the term of the loan. The fact that the amortization is 35 years and the term is 35 years meaning that at no point during the 35 years of the loan does the term actually expire and the government has the opportunity to renegotiate this loan under better circumstances. I am curious about why the government is not able to do that when we have an Aa1 credit rating. If that is something that is supposed be positive -- I am assuming that it is positive -- I will be concentrating on that because, like I said, the best-case scenario is we have major impacts for our government to provide infrastructure for the rest of the Northwest Territories. It has a major impact upon that.

As a representative of small communities like many of us around the table that don’t have infrastructure in place for our communities, we probably are not going to get it. That is because the money or the credit or the limits of our ability to provide more infrastructure to communities will be limited. We will be negatively impacted by the cost of this bridge even in the best-case scenario when this bridge comes in at $181 million. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.