Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Today I would like to use my reply to the opening address to talk about the Deh Cho Bridge. The

reason why it is important to talk about this today is that the people of the Northwest Territories have a right and need to know and understand what is happening with the Deh Cho Bridge Project because of its potential far-reaching impacts on the financial well-being of our Territory.

Looking at the history of this project, the enabling legislation called the Deh Cho Bridge Corporation Act was passed in the 14th Assembly. At that time

the legislation contemplated a $50 million bridge with a $6 per tonne toll that would finance the cost of the bridge. When the cost of the bridge more than tripled, the business case and cost-benefit analysis changed radically. In spite of this, because legislation passed several years earlier allowed it, the GNWT was able to proceed.

Amid much debate about the need for the bridge, whether it was a priority in the investment opportunities and demands for much needed capital infrastructure, the project was still pushed ahead. If anyone thinks that I did not question the advisability about proceeding with the bridge at every turn, this is just some of the Hansard of the questions and statements that I made in this House.

Our financial commitment started off in the form of loan guarantees. The first being for $3 million. We were told that would be the limit. Then it extended to $6 million, then to around $9 million. All the while Members were assured that this was the extent of the GNWT’s liability and the project would never proceed unless the federal government came to the table with significant financial contribution and underwriting.

All through this process the normal scrutiny of public transparency was blurred by the public-private partnership model which put the Deh Cho Bridge Corporation out front as the private partner, allowing the GNWT to avoid fulsome disclosure of the dealings surrounding the bridge in the name of corporate proprietary privacy.

Some would ask why would we have the Deh Cho Bridge Corporation acting as both the management teams and the proponents of this project. It was a way to keep the debt of the project off the books of the Government of the Northwest Territories, who at the time had a borrowing limit of $300 million. We have to be very clear about that. This was an attempt to build public infrastructure for public use while keeping that debt away from our balance sheet.

The argument was made for economic benefits that would flow to the community of Fort Providence from the construction, maintenance and management of the bridge. But as the proponent, the corporation had to have an equity stake in the project, equity which they had difficulty ever pulling together and at the 11th hour, even saw the

project’s general contractor, ATCON, coming to the

table to take advantage of the portion of the equity position in the bridge that they were about to build. I am not sure, Mr. Speaker, how ATCON’s equity participation was going to benefit the people of Fort Providence or the Northwest Territories.

Now, there is some doubt as to whether every Member of Cabinet fully and wholeheartedly supported proceeding. That three days, Mr. Speaker, before the last territorial election, when the ability of Cabinet Ministers and outgoing Premier should have passed the point of making substantive decisions affecting the Territories, the Concession Agreement was signed.

Mr. Speaker, it took many months for the Concession Agreement to be shared with Members of the Legislative Assembly and only came out after literally hours of questioning on the floor of the House in attempt to get an idea of the GNWT’s liability associated with this major piece of capital infrastructure, larger than anything the GNWT had ever undertaken. A project, although financed through the Deh Cho Bridge Corporation, was approved on the basis of a 100 percent guarantee of this territorial government. The GNWT went into this knowing full well that if anything went wrong, our government would be on the hook for the full amount of a loan. Mr. Speaker, this, in spite of my questions to Premier Roland dated February 20, 2008, in which -- and I quote from unedited Hansard, February 18, 2008 -- I had asked about the liability to the government. The Premier answered, “We are not guaranteeing the large loan. We have only guaranteed the $9 million.” The naysayers, as we were dubbed, were trying to ask questions we thought were responsible in the interest of holding the government accountable. That is our job, after all. We are often scoffed at and told, don’t worry. In spite of the many red flags along the way, we had no opportunity to intervene, just told to trust.

I remember being in the sound rooms at CBC Radio on a panel including the project manager, while he waved his arms in exasperation as I asked what I thought were reasonable questions. In spite of pressing demands on the time and budgets of the Department of Transportation for much needed infrastructure and maintenance across the North, very much energy and money from within the department has been expended on the bridge project. The total amount of that time and resources has never fully been disclosed, articulated or accounted for.

Mr. Speaker, who wanted the Deh Cho Bridge, you may wonder. No one that I know personally, except for some local contractors, understandably, who were able to secure some of the work on a project primarily dominated by southern services. The GNWT proceeded without a clear message of support from the constituents of the Northwest

Territories. I was told, don’t worry, the bridge will be paid for. Everyone north of the Mackenzie River crossing and freight coming to Hay River won’t be affected by any bridge toll. Federal employees would lose their isolated post allowance. Yellowknife and points north consumers would shoulder the higher cost of getting goods into their communities and the truck hauling, the diamond mines would pay. We thought, they thought a small way to catch your benefit from mining interests in the absence of royalties. It was all good. The project started out under some of the highest commodity prices in history and still in a time of heated economic activity, thus the high cost.

The Bridge Corporation or not, public private partnership or not, let’s call this what it was. It was a piece of public infrastructure financed in advance by a public government. The shell of the Deh Cho Bridge Corporation was only a means, as I said before, of a way to keep the project off the books with the GNWT so that we can stay within our federally legislated borrowing limit. There is probably a good reason why we have a borrowing limit. The inception and management of this project is the perfect point in case.

Strange how a project sold as having a fixed design, a fixed contract and a fixed price has recently gone through a major design revision, a change of general contractor and -- I’m coming to the price part -- just two weeks ago we were told in this House that the project was still on budget, if somewhat behind schedule.

So why are we talking about the Deh Cho Bridge today? The bridge is half built. The original general contractor of the project is gone. The management team for the bridge is now being handled in house because the lender is, understandably, getting nervous. We are way past the point of no return. The government is going to come to the people of the Northwest Territories, through us, for approval of an additional $15 million of public funds. The sensitive negotiations that the Minister spoke of yesterday are not yet concluded. So who knows what other surprises await us in the future.

We are told, don’t worry. It will be recaptured by the toll. Don’t forget that we are still also on the hook for the administration and operation of the toll collection for the next 35 years, probably more than $4 million per year and indexed. As to recovering all of this from the toll, the business case for the tolls revenue was really suspect, even before the recession and before the potential for an alternative to diesel-generated power existed for the diamond mines.

Mr. Speaker, I have always thought that there were more pressing needs for our government’s attention and resources than a bridge at Fort Providence.

On a personal note, I have probably used the ferry and the ice bridge more times than anyone in this

room. I thought that, except for a brief interruption in the spring, it was a system that worked for me well. But somebody wanted to leave this Territory a legacy. We have been left with a legacy all right. I don’t think we have even begun to see the end of it yet. We have been sold a bill of goods so many times already on this project that don’t worry, trust us, this is the limit of our involvement, just isn’t believable anymore.

So what options do we have going forward? Why do I think it is important for people to understand clearly where we are at? Yesterday in the House I said that the costs and mismanagement of this project has the potential of being the biggest thing that has ever happened to this government. This is why we have fiscal forecast scenarios that have been prepared. Option one would approve the $15 million appropriation for the bridge. This option includes a few other assumptions going forward, keeping us from crashing into the debt wall, but still isn’t too pretty for the interests of other capital projects and spending in the next few years. The other options aren’t options at all, because they see us taking the bridge debt onto our books and taking this project over and operating it for what it really is: a government project. The reason why those two options aren’t options at all is because the government would either be over the debt limit or essentially bankrupt.

Mr. Speaker, I can’t predict what Ottawa will have to say about that. I was here in the 13th Assembly

when previous governments had racked up $150 million debt and then enacted the Deficit Elimination Act for the next Assembly. The first thing the 13th Assembly had to do was roll back costs and spending, including the rollback of all the public service salaries by 6 percent across the board and make deep spending cuts to balance future years’ budgets.

Some would ask, why not just mothball the project and pick it up again in the future in better economic times? The problem with that idea is that apparently the pillars would have to be removed. That would cost more than it cost to put them there in the first place. Terminating the lending agreement that we are backstopping would also cost about $50 million in interest and penalties. That idea of stopping the bridge at this juncture is probably a non-starter. But just in case…