Thank you, Mr. Speaker. So what are our options here today? We can decide to continue on with the after-action review where MACA hires an independent contractor, or we demand a full-blown public inquiry with the power to subpoena documents and witnesses to testify before a quasi-judicial panel?
I would argue that there is a third path, which is potentially the best one in terms of balancing the need for a fully independent review with the need to do it relatively quickly and cost effectively, and that is to appoint an independent panel to manage an independent review team similar to what was done in British Columbia in 2017. While Cabinet has not yet agreed to this, I'm hopeful that by passing this motion demanding a public inquiry, by using this tool that we have available to us, it will put enough pressure on Premier and Cabinet to embrace this kind of fully independent review.
I wanted to raise the example of the British Columbia independent review into their wildfire and flooding events of 2017. Basically the BC Premier appointed two, independent, well-respected individuals to lead the independent review team. The leads were Maureen Chapman, BC hereditary chief of the Skawahlook First Nation, and George Abbott, a retired former BC Minister. They conducted public engagement. They completed a relatively speedy review over about five months. It was completed by April of 2018, the year after the disasters, and they came up with a report that had 108 recommendations which had public buy-in and it prompted the BC government to come up with an action plan to respond to each of them.
I have heard from some in leadership positions that a MACA after-action review is sufficient because sure there were some missed steps, but the evacuations were a success because no one died. At least not before they left the NWT. And sure, there was a little bit of confusion, but we just need to iron out the details and carry on. I think this perspective is profoundly disconnected from how most of us experienced last summer's emergencies. And honestly, this narrative usually slips into the realm of platitudes and excuses like everyone did their best, it was unprecedented, no one could have ever predicted Yellowknife would evacuate, and we couldn't control what Alberta did. And while these may have some truth behind them, this kind of narrative doesn't sound like it's leading us toward a serious reckoning with the oversights and failures and challenges. It's basically telling us not much different could have been done so it tells us not much different will be done in the future.
For me, the main sticking point with the default plan being proposed by the government is the insistence that MACA still be involved in managing certain aspects of the review even if it's conducted by an external contractor. So even if it's just managing the financial aspects of the contract, even if we're assured by the government that MACA staff wouldn't be directing the contractor, they would just be supporting or coordinating, practically speaking Regular Members and members of the public are not going to be in those rooms to be able to monitor to what extent MACA staff are coordinating and not crossing over the fine line towards guiding or directing a contractor. And even if there are ways that an oversight committee could object or complain, you've already compromised the credibility of this review by casting doubt on the independence of the contractor.
So to me, there is a simple solution to this. I believe that MACA should just stay out of the review. GNWT departments should just stay out of it. Except, of course, to provide the requested documents and information and participate the way all the other government departments would be expected to participate so that the independent reviewers can get to the bottom of what went wrong and how things can be fixed.
Now, I want to explain a bit about why so many people do not trust the GNWT to be able to manage a credible review of its own emergency management.
There's always going to be some people that don't trust the government. And in a community like Yellowknife, there are still people with kind of a frontier mentality. You know, just strike out on your own, don't rely on government, fend for yourself. But on the other hand, this mentality is limited by the fact that so very many NWT residents now work for the government themselves. But it's not this kind of everyday low-level distrust of government that is driving this outcry for a public and independent review. During a time of emergency or crisis, I actually think that people's instinct, even the skeptics, is to look to a central authority figure for direction. Last summer, I think people wanted to believe what they were being told by authorities. They wanted to understand what they were supposed to do. They wanted to follow the directions that were given. And that's at the very root of why people feel betrayed, because the people who drove out of Yellowknife right away that very evening the evacuation was called, the people who tried to avoid overburdening the busiest evacuation centres by going to alternative locations, the people who dutifully signed up for the return flights according to the official process, these were often the people who were most disappointed or ended up being under the greatest threat. People felt like they were played for fools by believing the government during a time that they were so incredibly vulnerable.
There was a social contract that was understood, that if you obey the government's order to leave our home the government will ensure you're safe. And many people from many different walks of life felt that that contract was broken, and that is a big deal.
I personally think it was a miracle that nobody died driving out on those highways either from being burnt up in their vehicles or from traffic accidents in the crush of thousands and thousands of vehicles leaving Yellowknife after a late-evening announcement of the evacuation, driving often all night through flames and smoke.
Now many people stepped up. They did heroic acts or everyday acts that protected and comforted evacuees, and those need to be highlighted and built upon too but not taken for granted. The GNWT should not be taking for granted or taking credit for the fact that no one died on that highway, or else we will fail to learn. Fundamentally, the government had to make decisions that had a huge impact on individuals and families' basic sense of security. Decisions about when exactly to allow people to remain at home, when to order them to flee their homes and communities, and when to allow them to return. Those kind of decisions need to be made with a very high understanding and skillful way of the risks that people face, the risks that they would face if they stayed home, the risks that they would face along the escape route, and the risks that they would face at whatever destination they're sent to. And all of those risks need to be understood within our NWT context. We have so many people already living with the effects of personal and intergenerational trauma, mental health issues, addictions issues, extremely high rates of family violence. And so I'm fearful that without a fully independent review with robust public participation, these risks will not come to light. The risk will not be understood and not be incorporated into future risk management decisions.
Now, we talk a lot about the need to protect and support first responders, and I think about the chaos and confusion around the evacuation of Stanton Hospital. Now patients were flown out, and preparations were made to shut down the entire hospital. Nurses and doctors were ordered to leave town with their families. And then at the 11th hour someone figured out that firefighters actually needed the hospital to stay open. So there was a complete shift, and parts of the ER and the hospital were kept open after all but with inadequate preparations and staffing arrangements. So I can only imagine that it must be a first responder, a health care professional's worst nightmare, to courageously stay behind, to stand on the frontlines, and know that due to poor planning you don't have the proper resources, the proper team, or supports to do your job.
Now many people have shared their heart-wrenching stories with me, and those stories are not mine to tell here today. I hope those people will feel comfortable bringing them forward during an independent review. But I do want to speak a bit about my own experience, and I've spoken about this before in the context of my involvement on the board of Yellowknife Women's Society and our frustration and terror as on organization attempting to work on a different frontline, working to try to find and help the underhoused population scattered in southern cities. So I won't go over all the details, certainly, but over and over again the women's society was assured that the GNWT, the authorities, governments, were taking care of the situation, that plans were being made, processes are underway. But over and over again, there was no follow through. And sometimes we could see obviously government staff were keeping very busy. There was a flurry of meetings and calls. But in very few cases did we see any of this result in actual effective help being provided to the vulnerable people that were ending up on the street. And when we weren't being assured that the GNWT was on top of everything, we were told the opposite, that the GNWT actually has no jurisdiction to do anything meaningful in Alberta and in any case, we shouldn't expect much because GNWT staff are evacuees too. But then when the Women's Society decided we would try to make things happen ourselves, we were told multiple times to stand down or to start again by going through proper channels, which usually led us to the same place, sending emails into a void with no response. And this kind of chaos may have been sort of understandable if it lasted a few days right at the beginning of the evacuation, or even a week, but after a month the same patterns were happening and we could only conclude that there was something seriously dysfunctional about the emergency management systems within the GNWT.
It was also alarming that it seemed to many that people ending up on the streets of Calgary and Edmonton was simply inevitable, that it was something that maybe we would try to observe or tally, count, but that no clear interventions to prevent this were ever identified as necessary or urgent, as if it was something that just happened but it was no one's responsibility and no one's fault. But I want us to re-enforce that this situation was not and is not inevitable. The fact that our fellow community members ended up on the streets of big cities in Alberta was entirely predictable, entirely preventable, and that if we're going to do this kind of prevention, it will require a major shift in our thinking that I feel is unlikely to occur unless there is an independent review and broad public participation and buy-in. Which brings me to what's the danger? What could be lost if we just went ahead with an after-action review that was led by MACA? What would we miss?
One thing that is top of mind for me is that many government staff, who had various roles in the evacuation or emergency management, would not feel comfortable speaking up or offering their insights at all. They need opportunities to offer their input confidentially if necessary. And if there were MACA officials or government officials present in the room or if they knew that GNWT staff would have access to the documents or testimony that they were putting forward, especially if that could be their bosses, it doesn't matter how much you reassure people that don't worry, you're safe from retaliation, these people will not feel safe in saying what they need to say and what we all need to hear.
These are people who were and hopefully still are working inside the system, and I think they may have some of the most valuable insights to offer into what went wrong and what could be done differently. Many are truly shaken by what they feel were their own departments' failings, and this has contributed to real damages to morale in the public service. Some have left the public service or will leave unless they see a true reckoning that gets at the root of what happened.
Other dangers is members of the public may not come forward at all. They may not see any point. They may not view this as a credible review, and we will lose all of their valuable insights. I think we should also consider that if there is no review that is seen as independent and credible, that next time there's an emergency people may not trust or follow government's direction at all. People may not agree to leave their homes and evacuate. And that's a real -- very much a real danger that we need to contemplate here. There's also the danger that people's sense of insecurity and their lack of faith in government causes them to move away from the North entirely.
So to summarize and conclude, obviously I feel that we do need a fully independent review without inserting GNWT departments in any of the coordination, management, or oversight. The point of this review is not to find scapegoats to blame but to come up with useful recommendations as expeditiously as possible for systemic change in our emergency management so that our community members can feel confident that we are confronting this changing climate, this terrifying future, that we're confronting it together, prepare to protect our families, our colleagues, and the most vulnerable amongst us. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.